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Abstract
This paper is the fourth in a series whose goal is to develop a fundamentally
new way of building theories of physics. The motivation comes from a desire
to address certain deep issues that arise in the quantum theory of gravity. Our
basic contention is that constructing a theory of physics is equivalent to finding
a representation in a topos of a certain formal language that is attached to the
system. Classical physics arises when the topos is the category of sets. Other
types of theory employ a different topos.
The previous papers in this series are concerned with implementing this pro-
gramme for a single system. In the present paper, we turn to considering a
collection of systems: in particular, we are interested in the relation between
the topos representation for a composite system, and the representations for its
constituents. We also study this problem for the disjoint sum of two systems.
Our approach to these matters is to construct a category of systems and to find
a topos representation of the entire category.
1email: a.doering@imperial.ac.uk
2email: c.isham@imperial.ac.uk
1 Introduction
This is the fourth in a series of papers whose aim is to construct a general framework
within which theories of physics can be expressed in a topos other than that of sets. In
the first paper, [1], we developed the idea of a typed, higher-order (local) language, LS,
for each physical system S, with the goal of finding representations of this language in
various topoi. Then, in the second and third papers, [2, 3], we showed in detail how the
‘daseinisation’ operation in quantum theory enables us to represent this language—and
a simpler propositional language—in a certain topos of presheaves.
In the present paper, we return to the more general aspects of our theory, and study
its application to a collection of systems, each one of which may be associated with
a different topos. For example, if S1, S2 is a pair of systems, with associated topoi
τ(S1) and τ(S2), and if S1 is a sub-system of S2, then we wish to consider how τ(S1)
is related to τ(S2). Similarly, if a composite system is formed from a pair of systems
S1, S2, what relations are there between the topos of the composite system and the
topoi of the constituent parts?
We start in Section 2, by introducing the notion of a ‘category of systems’, Sys,
whose objects are the physical systems of interest, and whose arrows represent situa-
tions in which one system is a ‘sub-system’, or a ‘constituent’ of another, or combina-
tions of such situations. A particular example of a sub-system arises in the ‘disjoint
sum’ of two systems. We argue on physical grounds that Sys can be regarded as a
symmetric monoidal category in two ways: one in which the monoidal product repre-
sents forming a composite system, and one in which the monoidal product represents
the disjoint sum. We show how such arrows correspond to ‘translations’ of the local
languages associated with the component systems. We also give a preliminary defini-
tion of the representation of the category Sys in a category of topoi, M(Sys). We
then show that the scheme works consistently in classical physics.
The idea of representing Sys is developed at length in Section 3. An important
ingredient is the ‘pull-back’ operation that arises when representing the arrows of Sys
in the category of topoi, M(Sys). Then, in Section 3.2 we bring together all these
ideas in the form of a set of rules for constructing a topos representation of the objects
and arrows in the Category Sys.
In Section 4 we show how our earlier work (in papers II and III) on toposifying
quantum theory can be extended to give a topos representation of Sys. The disjoint
sum of systems behaves well under the pull-back operation but the situation for the
composition of systems is different: something, we think, that reflects the existence of
entanglement in quantum theory. Finally, in Section 5 we speculate a little on how the
general scheme might be developed.
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2 The Category of Systems
2.1 Background Remarks
In one sense, there is only one true ‘system’, and that is the universe as a whole.
Concomitantly, there is just one local language, and one topos. However, in practice,
the universe is divided conceptually into portions that are sufficiently simple to be
amenable to theoretical discussion. Of course, this division is not unique, but it must be
such that the coupling between portions is weak enough that, to a good approximation,
their theoretical models can be studied in isolation from each other. Such an essentially
isolated3 portion of the universe is called a ‘sub-system’. By an abuse of language, sub-
systems of the universe are usually called ‘systems’ (so that the universe as a whole
is one super-system), and then we can talk about ‘sub-systems’ of these systems; or
‘composites’ of them; or sub-systems of the composite systems, and so on.
Of course, in practice, references by physicists to systems and sub-systems4 do not
generally signify actual sub-systems of the real universe but rather idealisations of
possible systems. This is what a physics lecturer means when he or she starts a lecture
by saying “Consider a point particle moving in three dimensions.....”.
To develop these ideas further we need mathematical control over the systems of
interest, and their interrelations. To this end, we start by focussing on some collection,
Sys, of physical systems to which a particular theory-type is deemed to be applicable.
For example, we could consider a collection of systems that are to be discussed using the
methodology of classical physics; or systems to be discussed using standard quantum
theory; or whatever. For completeness, we require that every sub-system of a system
in Sys is itself a member of Sys, as is every composite of members of Sys.
We shall assume that the systems in Sys are all associated with local languages of
the type discussed in paper I, and that they all have the same set of ground symbols
which, for the purposes of the present discussion, we take to be just Σ and R. It follows
that the languages L(S), S ∈ Sys, differ from each other only in the set of function
symbols FL(S)
(
Σ,R
)
; i.e., the set of physical quantities.
As a simple example of the system-dependence of the set of function symbols let
system S1 be a point particle moving in one dimension, and let the set of physical
quantities be FL(S1)
(
Σ,R
)
= {x, p,H}. In the language L(S1), these function-symbols
represent the position, momentum, and energy of the system respectively. On the other
hand, if S2 is a particle moving in three dimensions, then in the language L(S2) we
could have FL(S2)
(
Σ,R
)
= {x, y, z, px, py, pz, H} to allow for three-dimensional position
and momentum. Or, we could decide to add angular momentum as well, to give the
3The ideal monad has no windows.
4The word ‘sub-system’ does not only mean a collection of objects that is spatially localised. One
could also consider sub-systems of field systems by focussing on a just a few modes of the fields as
is done, for example, in the Robertson-Walker model for cosmology. Another possibility would be to
use fields localised in some fixed space, or space-time region provided that this is consistent with the
dynamics.
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set FL(S2)
(
Σ,R
)
= {x, y, z, px, py, pz, Jx, Jy, Jz, H}.
2.2 The Category Sys
2.2.1 The Arrows and Translations for the Disjoint Sum S1 ⊔ S2.
The use of local languages is central to our overall topos scheme, and therefore we need
to understand, in particular, (i) the relation between the languages L(S1) and L(S2)
if S1 is a sub-system of S2; and (ii) the relation between L(S1), L(S2) and L(S1 ⋄ S2),
where S1 ⋄ S2 denotes the composite of systems S1 and S2.
These discussions can be made more precise by regarding Sys as a category whose
objects are the systems.5 The arrows in Sys need to cover two basic types of relation:
(i) that between S1 and S2 if S1 is a ‘sub-system’ of S2; and (ii) that between a
composite system, S1 ⋄ S2, and its constituent systems, S1 and S2.
This may seem straightforward but, in fact, care is needed since although the idea of
a ‘sub-system’ seems intuitively clear, it is hard to give a physically acceptable definition
that is universal. However, some insight into this idea can be gained by considering
its meaning in classical physics. This is very relevant for the general scheme since one
of our main goals is to make all theories ‘look’ like classical physics in the appropriate
topos.
To this end, let S1 and S2 be classical systems whose state spaces are the symplectic
manifolds S1 and S2 respectively. If S1 is deemed to be a sub-system of S2, it is natural
to require that S1 is a sub-manifold of S2, i.e., S1 ⊆ S2. However, this condition cannot
be used as a definition of a ‘sub-system’ since the converse may not be true: i.e., if
S1 ⊆ S2, this does not necessarily mean that, from a physical perspective, S1 could, or
would, be said to be a sub-system of S2.
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On the other hand, there are situations where being a sub-manifold clearly does
imply being a physical sub-system. For example, suppose the state space S of a
system S is a disconnected manifold with two components S1 and S2, so that S is
the disjoint union, S1
∐
S2, of the sub-manifolds S1 and S2. Then it seems physically
appropriate to say that the system S itself is disconnected, and to write S = S1 ⊔ S2
where the symplectic manifolds that represent the sub-systems S1 and S2 are S1 and
S2 respectively.
One reason why it is reasonable to call S1 and S2 ‘sub-systems’ in this particular
situation is that any continuous dynamical evolution of a state point in S ≃ S1⊔S2 will
always lie in either one component or the other. This suggests that perhaps, in general,
5To control the size of Sys we assume that the collection of objects/systems is a set rather than
a more general class.
6 For example, consider the diagonal sub-manifold ∆(S) ⊂ S ×S of the symplectic manifold S ×S
that represents the composite S ⋄ S of two copies of a system S. Evidently, the states in ∆(S)
correspond to the situation in which both copies of S ‘march together’. It is doubtful if this would be
recognised physically as a sub-system.
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a necessary condition for a sub-manifold S1 ⊆ S2 to represent a physical sub-system
is that the dynamics of the system S2 must be such that S1 is mapped into itself
under the dynamical evolution on S2; in other words, S1 is a dynamically-invariant
sub-manifold of S2. This correlates with the idea mentioned earlier that sub-systems
are weakly-coupled with each other.
However, such a dynamical restriction is not something that should be coded into
the languages, L(S1) and L(S2): rather, the dynamics is to be associated with the
representation of these languages in the appropriate topoi.
Still, this caveat does not apply to the disjoint sum S1 ⊔ S2 of two systems S1, S2,
and we will assume that, in general, (i.e., not just in classical physics) it is legitimate
to think of S1 and S2 as being sub-systems of S1 ⊔ S2; something that we indicate by
defining arrows i1 : S1 → S1 ⊔ S2, and i2 : S2 → S1 ⊔ S2 in Sys.
To proceed further it is important to understand the connection between the pu-
tative arrows in the category Sys, and the ‘translations’ of the associated languages.
The first step is to consider what can be said about the relation between L(S1 ⊔ S2),
and L(S1) and L(S2). All three languages share the same ground-type symbols, and so
what we are concerned with is the relation between the function symbols of signature
Σ→R in these languages.
By considering what is meant intuitively by the disjoint sum, it seems plausible
that each physical quantity for the system S1 ⊔S2 produces a physical quantity for S1,
and another one for S2. Conversely, specifying a pair of physical quantities—one for
S1 and one for S2—gives a physical quantity for S1 ⊔ S2. In other words,
FL(S1⊔S2)
(
Σ,R
)
≃ FL(S1)
(
Σ,R
)
× FL(S2)
(
Σ,R
)
(2.1)
However, it is important not to be too dogmatic about statements of this type since in
non-classical theories new possibilities can arise that are counter to intuition.
Associated with (2.1) are the maps L(i1) : FL(S1⊔S2)
(
Σ,R
)
→ FL(S1)
(
Σ,R
)
and
L(i2) : FL(S1⊔S2)
(
Σ,R
)
→ FL(S2)
(
Σ,R
)
, defined as the projection maps of the product.
In the theory of local languages, these transformations are essentially translations [5]
of L(S1 ⊔ S2) in L(S1) and L(S2) respectively; a situation that we denote L(i1) :
L(S1 ⊔ S2)→ L(S1), and L(i2) : L(S1 ⊔ S2)→ L(S2).
To be more precise, these operations are translations if, taking L(i1) as the explana-
tory example, the map L(i1) : FL(S1⊔S2)
(
Σ,R
)
→ FL(S1)
(
Σ,R
)
is supplemented with
the following map from the ground symbols of L(S1 ⊔ S2) to those of L(S1):
L(i1)(Σ) := Σ, (2.2)
L(i1)(R) := R, (2.3)
L(i1)(1) := 1, (2.4)
L(i1)(Ω) := Ω. (2.5)
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Such a translation map is then extended to all type symbols using the definitions
L(i1)(T1 × T2 × · · · × Tn) = L(i1)(T1)× L(i1)(T2)× · · · × L(i1)(Tn), (2.6)
L(i1)(PT ) = P [L(i1)(T )] (2.7)
for all finite n and all type symbols T, T1, T2, . . . , Tn. This, in turn, can be extended
inductively to all terms in the language. Thus, in our case, the translations act trivially
on all the type symbols.
Arrows in Sys are translations. Motivated by this argument we now turn every-
thing around and, in general, define an arrow j : S1 → S in the category Sys to mean
that there is some physically meaningful way of transforming the physical quantities
in S to physical quantities in S1. If, for any pair of systems S1, S there is more than
one such transformation, then there will be more than one arrow from S1 to S.
To make this more precise, let Loc denote the collection of all (small7) local lan-
guages. This is a category whose objects are the local languages, and whose arrows
are translations between languages. Then our basic assumption is that the asso-
ciation S 7→ L(S) is a covariant functor from Sys to Locop, which we denote as
L : Sys→ Locop.
Note that the combination of a pair of arrows in Sys exists in so far as the associated
translations can be combined.
2.2.2 The Arrows and Translations for the Composite System S1 ⋄ S2.
Let us now consider the composition S1⋄S2 of a pair of systems. In the case of classical
physics, if S1 and S2 are the symplectic manifolds that represent the systems S1 and S2
respectively, then the manifold that represents the composite system is the cartesian
product S1×S2. This is distinguished by the existence of the two projection functions
pr1 : S1 × S2 → S1 and pr2 : S1 × S2 → S2.
It seems reasonable to impose the same type of structure on Sys: i.e., to require
there to be arrows p1 : S1 ⋄ S2 → S1 and p2 : S1 ⋄ S2 → S2 in Sys. However,
bearing in mind the definition above, these arrows p1, p2 exist if, and only if, there
are corresponding translations L(p1) : L(S1) → L(S1 ⋄ S2), and L(p2) : L(S2) →
L(S1 ⋄ S2). But there are such translations: for if A1 is a physical quantity for system
S1, then L(p1)(A1) can be defined as that same physical quantity, but now regarded as
pertaining to the combined system S1 ⋄ S2; and analogously for system S2.
8 We shall
denote this translated quantity, L(p1)(A1), by A1 ⋄ 1.
7This means that the collection of symbols is a set, not a more general class.
8For example, if A is the energy of particle 1, then we can talk about this energy in the combination
of a pair of particles. Of course, in—for example—classical physics there is no reason why the energy
of particle 1 should be conserved in the composite system, but that, dynamical, question is a different
matter.
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Note that we do not postulate any simple relation between FL(S1⋄S2)
(
Σ,R
)
and
FL(S1)
(
Σ,R
)
and FL(S2)
(
Σ,R
)
; i.e., there is no analogue of (2.1) for combinations of
systems.
The definitions above of the basic arrows suggest that we might also want to impose
the following conditions:
1. The arrows i1 : S1 → S1 ⊔ S2, and i2 : S2 → S1 ⊔ S2 are monic in Sys.
2. The arrows p1 : S1 ⋄ S2 → S1 and p2 : S1 ⋄ S2 → S2 are epic arrows in Sys.
However, we do not require that S1 ∪ S2 and S1 ⋄ S2 are the co-product and product,
respectively, of S1 and S2 in the category Sys.
2.2.3 The Concept of ‘Isomorphic’ Systems.
We also need to decide what it means to say that two systems S1 and S2 are isomorphic,
to be denoted S1 ≃ S2. As with the concept of sub-system, the notion of isomorphism
is to some extent a matter of definition rather than obvious physical structure, albeit
with the expectation that isomorphic systems in Sys will correspond to isomorphic
local languages, and be represented by isomorphic mathematical objects in any concrete
realisation of the axioms: for example, by isomorphic symplectic manifolds in classical
physics.
To a considerable extent, the physical meaning of ‘isomorphism’ depends on whether
one is dealing with actual physical systems, or idealisations of them. For example, an
electron confined in a box in Cambridge is presumably isomorphic to one confined in
the same type of box in London, although they are not the same physical system.
On the other hand, when a lecturer says “Consider an electron trapped in a box....”,
he/she is referring to an idealised system.
One could, perhaps, say that an idealised system is an equivalence class (under iso-
morphisms) of real systems, but even working only with idealisations does not entirely
remove the need for the concept of isomorphism.
For example, in classical mechanics, consider the (idealised) system S of a point
particle moving in a box, and let 1 denote the ‘trivial system’ that consists of just a
single point with no internal or external degrees of freedom. Now consider the system
S ⋄ 1. In classical mechanics this is represented by the symplectic manifold S × {∗},
where {∗} is a single point, regarded as a zero-dimensional manifold. However, S×{∗}
is isomorphic to the manifold S, and it is clear physically that the system S ⋄ 1 is
isomorphic to the system S. On the other hand, one cannot say that S ⋄ 1 is literally
equal to S, so the concept of ‘isomorphism’ needs to be maintained.
One thing that is clear is that if S1 ≃ S2 then FL(S1)
(
Σ,R
)
≃ FL(S2)
(
Σ,R
)
, and
if any other non-empty sets of function symbols are present, then they too must be
isomorphic.
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Note that when introducing a trivial system, 1, it necessary to specify its local
language, L(1). The set of function symbols FL(1)
(
Σ,R
)
is not completely empty
since, in classical physics, one does have a preferred physical quantity, which is just the
number 1. If one asks what is meant in general by the ‘number 1’ the answer is not
trivial since, in the reals IR, the number 1 is the multiplicative identity. It would be
possible to add the existence of such a unit to the axioms for R but this would involve
introducing a multiplicative structure and we do not know if there might be physically
interesting topos representations that do not have this feature.
For the moment then, we will say that the trivial system has just a single physical
quantity, which in classical physics translates to the number 1. More generally, for the
language L(1) we specify that FL(1)
(
Σ,R
)
:= {I}, i.e., FL(1)
(
Σ,R
)
has just a single
element, I, say. Furthermore, we add the axiom
: ∀s˜1∀s˜2, I(s˜1) = I(s˜2), (2.8)
where s˜1 and s˜2 are variables of type Σ. In fact, it seems natural to add such a trivial
quantity to the language L(S) for any system S, and from now on we will assume that
this has been done.
A related issue is that, in classical physics, if A is a physical quantity, then so is
rA for any r ∈ IR. This is because the set of classical quantities Aσ : Σσ → Rσ ≃ IR
forms a ring whose structure derives from the ring structure of IR. It would be possible
to add ring axioms for R to the language L(S), but we think this is too strong, not
least because, as shown in paper III, it fails in quantum theory [3]. Clearly, the general
question of axioms for R needs more thought: a task for later work.
If desired, an ‘empty ’ system, 0, can be added too, with FL(0)
(
Σ,R
)
:= ∅. This, so
called, ‘pure language’, L(0), is an initial object in the category Loc.
2.2.4 An Axiomatic Formulation of Sys
Let us now summarise, and clarify, our list of axioms for a category Sys:
1. The collection Sys is a small category where (i) the objects are the systems of
interest (or, if desired, isomorphism classes of such systems); and (ii) the arrows
are defined as above.
Thus the fundamental property of an arrow j : S1 → S in Sys is that it induces,
and is essentially defined by, a translation L(j) : L(S) → L(S1). Physically, it
corresponds to the physical quantities for system S being ‘pulled-back’ to give
physical quantities for system S1.
Arrows of particular interest are those associated with ‘sub-systems’ and ‘com-
posite systems’, as discussed above.
2. The axioms for a category are satisfied because:
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(a) Physically, the ability to form composites of arrows follows from the concept
of ‘pulling-back’ physical quantities. From a mathematical perspective, if
j : S1 → S2 and k : S2 → S3, then the translations give functions L(j) :
FL(S2)
(
Σ,R
)
→ FL(S1)
(
Σ,R
)
and L(k) : FL(S3)
(
Σ,R
)
→ FL(S2)
(
Σ,R
)
.
Then clearly L(j) ◦ L(k) : FL(S3)
(
Σ,R
)
→ FL(S1)
(
Σ,R
)
, and this can
thought of as the translation corresponding to the arrow k ◦ j : S1 → S3.
The associativity of the law of arrow combination can be proved in a similar
way.
(b) We add by hand a special arrow idS : S → S which is defined to correspond
to the translation L(idS) that is given by the identity map on FL(S)
(
Σ,R
)
.
Clearly, idS : S → S acts an an identity morphism should.
3. For any pair of systems S1, S2, there is a disjoint sum, denoted S1 ⊔ S2. The
disjoint sum has the following properties:
(a) For all systems S1, S2, S3 in Sys:
(S1 ⊔ S2) ⊔ S3 ≃ S1 ⊔ (S2 ⊔ S3). (2.9)
(b) For all systems S1, S2 in Sys:
S1 ⊔ S2 ≃ S2 ⊔ S1. (2.10)
(c) There are arrows in Sys:
i1 : S1 → S1 ⊔ S2 and i2 : S2 → S1 ⊔ S2 (2.11)
that are associated with translations in the sense discussed in Section 2.2.1.
These are associated with the decomposition
FL(S1⊔S2)
(
Σ,R
)
≃ FL(S1)
(
Σ,R
)
× FL(S2)
(
Σ,R
)
. (2.12)
We assume that if S1, S2 belong to Sys, then Sys also contains S1 ⊔ S2.
4. For any given pair of systems S1, S2, there is a composite system in Sys, denoted
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S1 ⋄ S2, with the following properties:
(a) For all systems S1, S2, S3 in Sys:
(S1 ⋄ S2) ⋄ S3 ≃ S1 ⋄ (S2 ⋄ S3). (2.13)
(b) For all systems S1, S2 in Sys:
S1 ⋄ S2 ≃ S2 ⋄ S1. (2.14)
9The product operation in a monoidal category is often written ‘⊗’. However, a different symbol
has been used here to avoid confusion with existing usages in physics of the tensor product sign ‘⊗’.
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(c) There are arrows in Sys:
p1 : S1 ⋄ S2 → S1 and p2 : S1 ⋄ S2 → S2 (2.15)
that are associated with translations in the sense discussed in Section 2.2.2.
We assume that if S1, S2 belong to Sys, then Sys also contains the composite
system S1 ⋄ S2.
5. It seems physically reasonable to add the axiom
(S1 ⊔ S2) ⋄ S ≃ (S1 ⋄ S) ⊔ (S2 ⋄ S) (2.16)
for all systems S1, S2, S. However, physical intuition can be a dangerous thing,
and so, as with most of these axioms, we are not dogmatic, and feel free to change
them as new insights emerge.
6. There is a trivial system, 1, such that for all systems S, we have
S ⋄ 1 ≃ S ≃ 1 ⋄ S (2.17)
7. It may be convenient to postulate an ‘empty system’, 0, with the properties
S ⋄ 0 ≃ 0 ⋄ S ≃ 0 (2.18)
S ⊔ 0 ≃ 0 ⊔ S ≃ S (2.19)
for all systems S.
Within the meaning given to arrows in Sys, 0 is a terminal object in Sys. This
is because the empty set of function symbols of signature Σ → R is a subset of
any other set of function symbols of this signature.
It might seem tempting to postulate that composition laws are well-behaved with
respect to arrows. Namely, if j : S1 → S2, then, for any S, there is an arrow S1 ⋄ S →
S2 ⋄ S and an arrow S1 ⊔ S → S2 ⊔ S.
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In the case of the disjoint sum, such an arrow can be easily constructed using (2.12).
First split the function symbols in FL(S1⊔S)
(
Σ,R
)
into FL(S1)
(
Σ,R
)
×FL(S)
(
Σ,R
)
and
the function symbols in FL(S2⊔S)
(
Σ,R
)
into FL(S2)
(
Σ,R
)
× FL(S)
(
Σ,R
)
. Since there
is an arrow j : S1 → S2, there is a translation L(j) : L(S2) → L(S1), given by a
mapping L(j) : FL(S2)
(
Σ,R
)
→ FL(S1)
(
Σ,R
)
. Of course, then there is also a mapping
L(j) × L(idS) : FL(S2)
(
Σ,R
)
× FL(S)
(
Σ,R
)
→ FL(S1)
(
Σ,R
)
× FL(S)
(
Σ,R
)
, i.e., a
translation between L(S2 ⊔ S) and L(S1 ⊔ S). Since we assume that there is an arrow
10A more accurate way of capturing this idea is to say that the operation Sys × Sys → Sys in
which
〈S1, S2〉 7→ S1 ⋄ S2 (2.20)
is a bi-functor from Sys× Sys to Sys. Ditto for the operation in which 〈S1, S2〉 7→ S1 ⊔ S2.
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in Sys whenever there is a translation (in the opposite direction), there is indeed an
arrow S1 ⊔ S → S2 ⊔ S.
In the case of the composition, however, this would require a translation L(S2 ⋄ S)→
L(S1 ⋄ S), and this cannot be done in general since we have no prima facie information
about the set of function symbols FL(S2⋄S)
(
Σ,R
)
. However, if we restrict the arrows
in Sys to be those associated with sub-systems, combination of systems, and compo-
sitions of such arrows, then it is easy to see that the required translations exist (the
proof of this makes essential use of (2.16)).
If we make this restriction of arrows, then the axioms (2.14), (2.17–2.20), mean
that, essentially, Sys has the structure of a symmetric monoidal11 category in which
the monoidal product operation is ‘⋄’, and the left and right unit object is 1. There
is also a monoidal structure associated with the disjoint sum ‘⊔’, with 0 as the unit
object.
We say ‘essentially’ because in order to comply with all the axioms of a monoidal
category, Sys must satisfy certain additional, so-called, ‘coherence’ axioms. However,
from a physical perspective these are very plausible statements about (i) how the unit
object 1 intertwines with the ⋄-operation; how the null object intertwines with the
⊔-operation; and (iii) certain properties of quadruple products (and disjoint sums) of
systems.
A simple example of a category Sys. It might be helpful at this point to give
a simple example of a category Sys. To that end, let S denote a point particle that
moves in three dimensions, and let us suppose that S has no sub-systems other than
the trivial system 1. Then S ⋄ S is defined to be a pair of particles moving in three
dimensions, and so on. Thus the objects in our category are 1, S, S ⋄S, . . ., S ⋄S ⋄· · ·S
. . . where the ‘⋄’ operation is formed any finite number of times.
At this stage, the only arrows are those that are associated with the constituents
of a composite system. However, we could contemplate adding to the systems the
disjoint sum S ⊔ (S ⋄ S) which is a system that is either one particle or two particles
(but, of course, not both at the same time). And, clearly, we could extend this to
S ⊔ (S ⋄ S) ⊔ (S ⋄ S ⋄ S), and so on. Each of these disjoint sums comes with its own
arrows, as explained above.
Note that this particular category of systems has the property that it can be treated
using either classical physics or quantum theory.
11In the actual definition of a monoidal category the two isomorphisms in (2.17) are separated from
each other, whereas we have identified them. Further more, these isomorphism are required to be
natural. This seems a correct thing to require in our case, too.
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2.3 Representations of Sys in Topoi
We assume that all the systems in Sys are to be treated with the same theory type.
We also assume that systems in Sys with the same language are to be represented in
the same topos. Then we define:12
Definition 2.1 A topos realisation of Sys is an association, φ, to each system S in
Sys, of a triple φ(S) = 〈ρφ,S,L(S), τφ(S)〉 where:
(i) τφ(S) is the topos in which the theory-type applied to system S is to be realised.
(ii) L(S) is the local language in Loc that is associated with S. This is not dependent
on the realisation φ.
(iii) ρφ,S is a representation of the local language L(S) in the topos τφ(S). As a more
descriptive piece of notation we write ρφ,S : L(S)  τφ(S). The key part of this
representation is the map
ρφ,S : FL(S)
(
Σ,R
)
→ Homτφ(S)
(
Σφ,S,Rφ,S
)
(2.21)
where Σφ,S and Rφ,S are the state object and quantity-value object, respectively,
of the representation φ in the topos τφ(S). As a convenient piece of notation we
write Aφ,S := ρφ,S(A) for all A ∈ FL(S)
(
Σ,R
)
.
This definition is only partial; the possibility of extending it will be discussed shortly.
Now, if j : S1 → S is an arrow in Sys, then there is a translation arrow L(j) :
L(S)→ L(S1). Thus we have the beginnings of a commutative diagram
S 〈ρφ,S,L(S), τφ(S)〉-
φ
S1 〈ρφ,S1 ,L(S1), τφ(S1)〉-
φ
?
j
6
?×L(j)×?
(2.22)
However, to be useful, the arrow on the right hand side of this diagram should refer to
some relation between (i) the topoi τφ(S1) and τφ(S); and (ii) the realisations ρφ,S1 :
L(S1) τφ(S1) and ρφ,S : L(S) τφ(S): this is the significance of the two ‘?’ symbols
in the arrow written ‘?× L(j)×?’.
Indeed, as things stand, Definition 2.1 says nothing about relations between the
topoi representations of different systems in Sys. We are particularly interested in the
12As emphasised already, the association S 7→ L(S) is generally not one-to-one: i.e., many systems
may share the same language. Thus, when we come discuss the representation of the language L(S)
in a topos, the extra information about the system S is used in fixing the representation.
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situation where there are two different systems S1 and S with an arrow j : S1 → S in
Sys.
We know that the arrow j is associated with a translation L(j) : L(S) → L(S1),
and an attractive possibility, therefore, would be to seek, or postulate, a ‘covering’
map φ(L(j)) : Homτφ(S)
(
Σφ,S,Rφ,S
)
→ Homτφ(S1)
(
Σφ,S1,Rφ,S1
)
to be construed as a
topos representation of the translation L(j) : L(S) → L(S1), and hence of the arrow
j : S1 → S in Sys.
This raises the questions of what properties these ‘translation representations’
should possess in order to justify saying that they ‘cover’ the translations. A mini-
mal requirement is that if k : S2 → S1 and j : S1 → S, then the map φ(L(j ◦ k)) :
Homτφ(S)
(
Σφ,S,Rφ,S
)
→ Homτφ(S2)
(
Σφ,S2,Rφ,S2
)
factorises as
φ(L(j ◦ k)) = φ(L(k)) ◦ φ(L(j)). (2.23)
We also require that
φ(L(idS)) = id : Homτφ(S)
(
Σφ,S,Rφ,S
)
→ Homτφ(S)
(
Σφ,S,Rφ,S
)
(2.24)
for all systems S.
The conditions (2.23) and (2.24) seem eminently plausible, and they are not partic-
ularly strong. A far more restrictive axiom would be to require the following diagram
to commute:
FL(S1)
(
Σ,R
)
Homτφ(S1)
(
Σφ,S1 ,Rφ,S1
)
-
ρφ,S1
FL(S)
(
Σ,R
)
Homτφ(S)
(
Σφ,S,Rφ,S
)
-ρφ,S
?
L(j)
?
φ(L(j))
(2.25)
At first sight, this requirement seems very appealing. However, caution is needed when
postulating ‘axioms’ for a theoretical structure in physics. It is easy to get captivated by
the underlying mathematics and to assume, erroneously, that what is mathematically
elegant is necessarily true in the physical theory.
The translation φ(L(j)) maps an arrow from Σφ,S to Rφ,S to an arrow from Σφ,S1
to Rφ,S1 . Intuitively, if Σφ,S1 is a ‘much larger’ object than Σφ,S (they lie in different
topoi, so no direct comparison is available), the translation can only be ‘faithful’ on
some part of Σφ,S1 that can be identified with (the ‘image’ of) Σφ,S. A concrete example
of this will show up in the treatment of composite quantum systems, see Subsection
4.3. As one might expect, a form of entanglement plays a role here.
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2.4 Classical Physics in This Form
2.4.1 The Rules so Far.
Constructing maps φ(L(j)) : Homτφ(S)
(
Σφ,S,Rφ,S
)
→ Homτφ(S1)
(
Σφ,S1,Rφ,S1
)
is likely
to be complicated when τφ(S) and τφ(S1) are different topoi, and so we begin with the
example of classical physics, where the topos is always Sets.
In general, we are interested in the relation(s) between the representations ρφ,S1 :
L(S1) τφ(S1) and ρφ,S : L(S) τφ(S) that is associated with an arrow j : S1 → S in
Sys. In classical physics, we only have to study the relation between the representations
ρσ,S1 : L(S1) Sets and ρσ,S : L(S) Sets.
Let us summarise what we have said so far (with σ denoting the Sets-realisation
of classical physics):
1. For any system S in Sys, a representation ρσ,S : L(S)  Sets consists of the
following ingredients.
(a) The ground symbol Σ is represented by a symplectic manifold, Σσ,S :=
ρσ,S(Σ), that serves as the classical state space.
(b) For all systems S, the ground symbol R is represented by the real numbers
IR, i.e., Rσ,S = IR, where Rσ,S := ρσ,S(R).
(c) Each function symbol A : Σ→ R in FL(S)
(
Σ,R
)
is represented by a function
Aσ,S = ρσ,S(A) : Σσ,S → IR in the set of functions
13 C(Σσ,S; IR).
2. The trivial system is mapped to a singleton set {∗} (viewed as a zero-dimensional
symplectic manifold):
Σσ,1 := {∗}. (2.26)
The empty system is represented by the empty set:
Σσ,0 := ∅. (2.27)
3. Propositions about the system S are represented by (Borel) subsets of the state
space Σσ,S.
4. The composite system S1⋄S2 is represented by the Cartesian product Σσ,S1×Σσ,S2 ;
i.e.,
Σσ, S1⋄S2 ≃ Σσ,S1 × Σσ,S2 . (2.28)
The disjoint sum S1 ⊔ S2 is represented by the disjoint union Σσ,S1
∐
Σσ,S2 ;i.e.,
Σσ,S1⊔S2 ≃ Σσ,S1
∐
Σσ,S2 . (2.29)
13In practice, these functions are required to be measurable with respect to the Borel structures on
the symplectic manifold Σσ and IR. Many of the functions will also be smooth, but we will not go
into such details here.
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5. Let j : S1 → S be an arrow in Sys. Then
(a) There is a translation map L(j) : FL(S)
(
Σ,R
)
→ FL(S1)
(
Σ,R
)
.
(b) There is a symplectic function σ(j) : Σσ,S1 → Σσ,S from the symplectic
manifold Σσ,S1 to the symplectic manifold Σσ,S .
The existence of this function σ(j) : Σσ,S1 → Σσ,S follows directly from the proper-
ties of sub-systems and composite systems in classical physics. It is discussed in detail
below in Section (2.4.2). As we shall see, it underpins the classical realisation of our
axioms.
These properties of the arrows stem from the fact that the linguistic function sym-
bols in FL(S)
(
Σ,R
)
are represented by real-valued functions in C(Σσ,S , IR). Thus we
can write ρσ,S : FL(S)
(
Σ,R
)
→ C(Σσ,S , IR), and similarly ρσ,S1 : FL(S1)
(
Σ,R
)
→
C(Σσ,S1 , IR). The diagram in (2.25) now becomes
FL(S1)
(
Σ,R
)
C(Σσ,S1 , IR)-ρσ,S1
FL(S)
(
Σ,R
)
C(Σσ,S , IR)-
ρσ,S
?
L(j)
?
σ(L(j))
(2.30)
and, therefore, the question of interest is if there is a ‘translation representation’ func-
tion σ(L(j)) : C(Σσ,S , IR)→ C(Σσ,S1 , IR) so that this diagram commutes.
Now, as stated above, a physical quantity, A, for the system S is represented in
classical physics by a real-valued function Aσ,S = ρσ,S(A) : Σσ,S → IR. Similarly, the
representation of L(j)(A) for S1 is given by a function Aσ,S1 := ρσ,S1(A) : Σσ,S1 → IR.
However, in this classical case we also have the function σ(j) : Σσ,S1 → Σσ,S , and
it is clear that we can use it to define [ρσ,S1(L(j)(A)](s) := ρσ,S(A)
(
σ(j)(s)
)
for all
s ∈ Σσ,S1 . In other words
ρσ,S1
(
L(j)(A)
)
= ρσ,S(A) ◦ σ(j) (2.31)
or, in simpler notation (
(L(j)(A)
)
σ,S1
= Aσ,S ◦ σ(j). (2.32)
But then it is clear that a translation-representation function σ(L(j)) : C(Σσ,S , IR)→
C(Σσ,S1 , IR) with the desired property of making (2.30) commute can be defined by
σ(L(j))(f) := f ◦ σ(j) (2.33)
for all f ∈ C(Σσ,S , IR); i.e., the function σ(L(j))(f) : Σσ,S1 → IR is the usual pull-back
of the function f : Σσ,S → IR by the function σ(j) : Σσ,S1 → Σσ,S. Thus, in the case of
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classical physics, the commutative diagram in (2.22) can be completed to give
S 〈ρσ,S,L(S),Sets〉-σ
S1 〈ρσ,S1 ,L(S1),Sets〉-
σ
?
j
6
σ(L(j))×L(j)× id
(2.34)
2.4.2 Details of the Translation Representation.
The translation representation for a disjoint sum of classical systems. We
first consider arrows of the form
S1
i1→ S1 ⊔ S2
i2← S2 (2.35)
from the components S1, S2 to the disjoint sum S1⊔S2. The systems S1, S2 and S1⊔S2
have symplectic manifolds Σσ,S1 , Σσ,S2 and Σσ,S1⊔S2 = Σσ,S1
∐
Σσ,S2 . We write i := i1.
Let S be a classical system. We assume that the function symbols A ∈ FL(S)
(
Σ,R
)
in the language L(S) are in bijective correspondence with an appropriate subset of the
functions Aσ,S ∈ C(Σσ,S, IR).
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There is an obvious translation representation. For if A ∈ FL(S1⊔S2)
(
Σ,R
)
, then
since Σσ,S1⊔S2 = Σσ,S1
∐
Σσ,S1 , the associated function Aσ,S1⊔S2 : Σσ,S1⊔S2 → IR is
given by a pair of functions A1 ∈ C(Σσ,S1 , IR) and A2 ∈ C(Σσ,S2 , IR); we write
Aσ,S1⊔S2 = 〈A1, A2〉. It is natural to demand that the translation representation
σ(L(i))(Aσ,S1⊔S2) is A1. Note that what is essentially being discussed here is the
classical-physics representation of the relation (2.1).
The canonical choice for σ(i) is
σ(i) : Σσ,S1 → Σσ,S1⊔S2 = Σσ,S1
∐
Σσ,S2 (2.36)
s1 7→ s1. (2.37)
Then the pull-back along σ(i),
σ(i)∗ : C(Σσ,S1⊔S2 , IR) → C(Σσ,S1 , IR) (2.38)
Aσ,S1⊔S2 7→ Aσ,S1⊔S2 ◦ σ(i), (2.39)
maps (or ‘translates’) the topos representative Aσ,S1⊔S2 = 〈A1, A2〉 of the function
symbol A ∈ FL(S1⊔S2)
(
Σ,R
)
to a real-valued function Aσ,S1⊔S2 ◦ σ(i) on Σσ,S1 . This
function is clearly equal to A1.
14Depending on the setting, one can assume that FL(S)
(
Σ,R
)
contains function symbols corre-
sponding bijectively to measurable, continuous or smooth functions.
15
The translation in the case of a composite classical system. We now consider
arrows in Sys of the form
S1
p1
← S1 ⋄ S2
p2
→ S2 (2.40)
from the composite classical system S1 ⋄ S2 to the constituent systems S1 and S2.
Here, p1 signals that S1 is a constituent of the composite system S1 ⋄ S2, likewise p2.
The systems S1, S2 and S1 ⋄ S2 have symplectic manifolds Σσ,S1 , Σσ,S2 and Σσ,S1⋄S2 =
Σσ,S1 × Σσ,S2 , respectively; i.e., the state space of the composite system S1 ⋄ S2 is the
cartesian product of the state spaces of the components. For typographical simplicity
in what follows we denote p := p1.
There is a canonical translation L(p) between the languages L(S1) and L(S1 ⋄ S2)
whose representation is the following. Namely, if A is in FL(S1)
(
Σ,R
)
, then the cor-
responding function Aσ,S1 ∈ C(Σσ,S1 , IR) is translated to a function σ(L(p))(Aσ,S1) ∈
C(Σσ,S1⋄S2 , IR) such that
σ(L(p))(Aσ,S1)(s1, s2) = Aσ,S1(s1) (2.41)
for all (s1, s2) ∈ Σσ,S1 × Σσ,S2 .
This natural translation representation is based on the fact that, for the symplectic
manifold Σσ,S1⋄S2 = Σσ,S1 × Σσ,S2 , each point s ∈ Σσ,S1⋄S2 can be identified with a
pair, (s1, s2), of points s1 ∈ Σσ,S1 and s2 ∈ Σσ,S2 . This is possible since the cartesian
product Σσ,S1 × Σσ,S2 is a product in the categorial sense and hence has projections
Σσ,S1 ← Σσ,S1 × Σσ,S2 → Σσ,S2 . Then the translation representation of functions is
constructed in a straightforward manner. Thus, let
σ(p) : Σσ,S1 × Σσ,S2 → Σσ,S1
(s1, s2) 7→ s1 (2.42)
be the canonical projection. Then, if Aσ,S1 ∈ C(Σσ,S1 , IR), the function
Aσ,S1 ◦ σ(p) ∈ C(Σσ,S1 × Σσ,S2 , IR) (2.43)
is such that, for all (s1, s2) ∈ Σσ,S1 × Σσ,S2 ,
Aσ,S1 ◦ σ(p)(s1, s2) = Aσ,S1(s1). (2.44)
Thus we can define
σ(L(p))(Aσ,S1) := Aσ,S1 ◦ σ(p). (2.45)
Clearly, σ(L(p))(Aσ,S1) can be seen as the representation of the function symbol A⋄1 ∈
FL(S1⋄S2)
(
Σ,R
)
.
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3 Theories of Physics in a General Topos
3.1 The Pull-Back Operations
3.1.1 The Pull-Back of Physical Quantities.
Motivated by the above, let us try now to see what can be said about the scheme in
general. Basically, what is involved is the topos representation of translations of lan-
guages. To be more precise, let j : S1 → S be an arrow in Sys, so that there is a trans-
lation L(j) : L(S) → L(S1) defined by the translation function L(j) : FL(S)
(
Σ,R
)
→
FL(S1)
(
Σ,R
)
. Now suppose that the systems S and S1 are represented in the topoi τφ(S)
and τφ(S1) respectively. Then, in these representations, the function symbols of signa-
ture Σ → R in L(S) and L(S1) are represented by elements of Homτφ(S)
(
Σφ,S,Rφ,S
)
and Homτφ(S1)
(
Σφ,S1,Rφ,S1
)
respectively.
Our task is to find a function
φ(L(j)) : Homτφ(S)
(
Σφ,S,Rφ,S
)
→ Homτφ(S1)
(
Σφ,S1 ,Rφ,S1
)
(3.1)
that can be construed as the topos representation of the translation L(j) : L(S) →
L(S1), and hence of the arrow j : S1 → S in Sys. We are particularly interested in
seeing if φ(L(j)) can be chosen so that the following diagram, (see (2.25)) commutes:
FL(S1)
(
Σ,R
)
Homτφ(S1)
(
Σφ,S1 ,Rφ,S1
)
-
ρφ,S1
FL(S)
(
Σ,R
)
Homτφ(S)
(
Σφ,S,Rφ,S
)
-ρφ,S
?
L(j)
?
φ(L(j))
(3.2)
However, as has been emphasised already, it is not clear that one should expect to
find a function φ(L(j)) : Homτφ(S)
(
Σφ,S,Rφ,S
)
→ Homτφ(S1)
(
Σφ,S1,Rφ,S1
)
with this
property. The existence and/or properties of such a function will be dependent on the
theory-type, and it seems unlikely that much can be said in general about the diagram
(3.2). Nevertheless, let us see how far we can get in discussing the existence of such a
function in general.
Thus, if µ ∈ Homτφ(S)
(
Σφ,S,Rφ,S
)
, the critical question is if there is some ‘nat-
ural’ way whereby this arrow can be ‘pulled-back’ to give an element φ(L(j))(µ) ∈
Homτφ(S1)
(
Σφ,S1 ,Rφ,S1
)
.
The first pertinent remark is that µ is an arrow in the topos τφ(S), whereas the
sought-for pull-back will be an arrow in the topos τφ(S1), and so we need a mechanism
for getting from one topos to the other (this problem, of course, does not arise in
classical physics since the topos of every representation is always Sets).
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The obvious way of implementing this change of topos is via some functor, τφ(j)
from τφ(S) to τφ(S1). Indeed, given such a functor, an arrow µ : Σφ,S →Rφ,S in τφ(S)
is transformed to the arrow
τφ(j)(µ) : τφ(j)(Σφ,S)→ τφ(j)(Rφ,S) (3.3)
in τφ(S1).
To convert this to an arrow from Σφ,S1 to Rφ,S1 , we need to supplement (3.3) with
a pair of arrows φ(j), βφ(j) in τφ(S1) to get the diagram:
Σφ,S1 Rφ,S1
τφ(j)(Σφ,S) τφ(j)(Rφ,S)-
τφ(j)(µ)
6
φ(j)
?
βφ(j)
(3.4)
The pull-back, φ(L(j))(µ) ∈ Homτφ(S1)
(
Σφ,S1 ,Rφ,S1
)
, with respect to these choices can
then be defined as
φ(L(j))(µ) := βφ(j) ◦ τφ(j)(µ) ◦ φ(j). (3.5)
It follows that a key part of the construction of a topos representation, φ, of Sys will
be to specify the functor τφ(j) from τφ(S) to τφ(S1), and the arrows φ(j) : Σφ,S1 →
τφ(j)(Σφ,S) and βφ(j) : τφ(j)(Rφ,S) → Rφ,S1 in the topos τφ(S1). These need to be
defined in such a way as to be consistent with a chain of arrows S2 → S1 → S.
When applied to the representative Aφ,S : Σφ,S → Rφ,S of a physical quantity
A ∈ FL(S)
(
Σ,R
)
, the diagram (3.4) becomes (augmented with the upper half)
Σφ,S1 Rφ,S1-
φ(L(j))(Aφ,S)
τφ(j)(Σφ,S) τφ(j)(Rφ,S)-
6
φ(j)
?
βφ(j)
τφ(j)(Aφ,S)
Σφ,S Rφ,S-
Aφ,S
?
τφ(j)
?
τφ(j)
(3.6)
The commutativity of (3.2) would then require
φ(L(j))(Aφ,S) = (L(j)A)φ,S1 (3.7)
or, in a more expanded notation,
φ(L(j)) ◦ ρφ,S = ρφ,S1 ◦ L(j), (3.8)
where both the left hand side and the right hand side of (3.8) are mappings from
FL(S)
(
Σ,R
)
to Homτφ(S1)
(
Σφ,S1 ,Rφ,S1
)
.
18
Note that the analogous diagram in classical physics is simply
Σσ,S1 IR-
σ(L(j))(Aσ,S)
Σσ,S IR-
Aσ,S
6
σ(j)
?
id
(3.9)
and the commutativity/pull-back condition (3.7) becomes
σ(L(j))(Aσ,S) = (L(j)A)φ,S1 (3.10)
which is satisfied by virtue of (2.33).
It is clear from the above that the arrow φ(j) : Σφ,S1 → τφ(j)(Σφ,S) can be viewed
as the topos analogue of the map σ(j) : Σσ,S1 → Σσ,S that arises in classical physics
whenever there is an arrow j : S1 → S.
3.1.2 The Pull-Back of Propositions.
More insight can be gained into the nature of the triple 〈τφ(j), φ(j), βφ(j)〉 by consider-
ing the analogous operation for propositions. First, consider an arrow j : S1 → S in Sys
in classical physics. Associated with this there is (i) a translation L(j) : L(S)→ L(S1);
(ii) an associated translation mapping L(j) : FL(S)
(
Σ,R
)
→ FL(S1)
(
Σ,R
)
; and (iii) a
symplectic function σ(j) : Σσ,S1 → Σσ,S .
Let K be a (Borel) subset of the state space, Σσ,S ; hence K represents a proposition
about the system S. Then σ(j)∗(K) := σ(j)−1(K) is a subset of Σσ,S1 and, as such,
represents a proposition about the system S1. We say that σ(j)
∗(K) is the pull-back to
Σσ,S1 of the S-proposition represented by K. The existence of such pull-backs is part
of the consistency of the representation of propositions in classical mechanics, and it
is important to understand what the analogue of this is in our topos scheme.
Consider the general case with the two systems S1, S as above. Then let K be a
proposition, represented as a sub-object of Σφ,S, with a monic arrow iK : K →֒ Σφ,S.
The question now is if the triple 〈τφ(j), φ(j), βφ(j)〉 can be used to pull K back to give
a proposition in τ(S1), i.e., a sub-object of Σφ,S1?
The first requirement is that the functor τφ(j) : τφ(S) → τφ(S1) should preserve
monics ; for example by being left-exact. In this case, the monic arrow iK : K →֒ Σφ,S
in τφ(S) is transformed to the monic arrow
τφ(j)(iK) : τφ(j)(K) →֒ τφ(j)(Σφ,S) (3.11)
in τφ(S1); thus τφ(j)(K) is a sub-object of τφ(j)(Σφ,S) in τφ(S1). It is a property of
a topos that the pull-back of a monic arrow is monic ; i.e., if M →֒ Y is monic, and
if ψ : X → Y , then ψ−1(M) is a sub-object of X. Therefore, in the case of interest,
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the monic arrow τφ(j)(iK) : τφ(j)(K) →֒ τφ(j)(Σφ,S) can be pulled back along φ(j) :
Σφ,S1 → τφ(j)(Σφ,S) (see diagram (3.6)) to give the monic φ(j)
−1(τφ(j)(K)) ⊆ Σφ,S1 .
This is a candidate for the pull-back of the proposition represented by the sub-object
K ⊆ Σφ,S.
In conclusion, propositions can be pulled-back provided that the functor τφ(j) :
τφ(S)→ τφ(S1) preserves monics; for example, by being left-exact. In fact, the property
of being left-exact is so natural that we shall add it to our list of postulates; see below.
3.2 The Topos Rules for Theories of Physics
We will now present our general rules for using topos theory in the mathematical
representation of physical systems and their theories.
Definition 3.1 The category M(Sys) is defined as follows:
1. The objects of M(Sys) are the topoi that are to be used in representing the
systems in Sys.
2. The arrows from τ1 to τ2 are defined to be the left-exact functors from τ1 to τ2.
Definition 3.2 The rules for using topos theory are as follows:
1. A topos realisation, φ, of Sys in M(Sys) is an assignment, to each system S in
Sys, of a triple φ(S) = 〈ρφ,S,L(S), τφ(S)〉 where:
(a) τφ(S) is the topos in M(Sys) in which the theory-type applied to system S
is to be realised.
(b) L(S) is the local language that is associated with S. This is independent of
the realisation, φ, of Sys in M(Sys).
(c) ρφ,S : L(S)  τφ(S) is a representation of the local language L(S) in the
topos τφ(S).
(d) In addition, for each arrow j : S1 → S in Sys there is a triple 〈τφ(j),φ(j),
βφ(j)〉 that interpolates between ρφ,S : L(S)  τφ(S) and ρφ,S1 : L(S1)  
τφ(S1); for details see below.
2. (a) The representations, ρφ,S(Σ) and ρφ,S(R), of the ground symbols Σ and R
in L(S) are denoted Σφ,S and Rφ,S, respectively. They are known as the
‘state object’ and ‘quantity-value object’ in τφ(S).
(b) The representation by ρφ,S of each function symbol A : Σ→R of the system
S is an arrow, ρφ,S(A) : Σφ,S → Rφ,S in τφ(S); we will usually denote this
arrow as Aφ,S : Σφ,S → Rφ,S.
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(c) Propositions about the system S are represented by sub-objects of Σφ,S.
These will typically be of the form A−1φ,S(Ξ), where Ξ is a sub-object of
Rφ,S.
15
3. Generally, there are no ‘microstates’ for the system S; i.e., no global elements
(arrows 1→ Σφ,S) of the state object Σφ,S; or, if there are any, they may not be
enough to determine Σφ,S as an object in τφ(S).
Instead, the role of a state is played by a ‘truth sub-object’ T of PΣφ,S.
16 If
γ ∈ Sub(Σφ,S) ≃ Γ(PΣφ,S), the ‘truth of the proposition represented by γ’ is
defined to be
ν( pγq ∈ T ) = [[ γ˜ ∈ T˜ ]]φ 〈γ,T〉 (3.12)
See paper II for full information on the idea of a ‘truth object’ [2].
4. There is a ‘unit object’ 1M(Sys) in M(Sys) such that if 1Sys denotes the trivial
system in Sys then, for all topos realisations φ,
τφ(1Sys) = 1M(Sys). (3.13)
Motivated by the results for quantum theory (see Section 4.2), we postulate that
the unit object 1M(Sys) in M(Sys) is the category of sets:
1M(Sys) = Sets. (3.14)
5. To each arrow j : S1 → S in Sys, we have the following:
(a) There is a translation L(j) : L(S) → L(S1). This is specified by a map
between function symbols: L(j) : FL(S)
(
Σ,R
)
→ FL(S1)
(
Σ,R
)
.
(b) With the translation L(j) : FL(S)
(
Σ,R
)
→ FL(S1)
(
Σ,R
)
there is associated
a corresponding function
φ(L(j)) : Homτφ(S)
(
Σφ,S,Rφ,S
)
→ Homτφ(S1)
(
Σφ,S1 ,Rφ,S1
)
. (3.15)
These may, or may not, fit together in the commutative diagram:
FL(S1)
(
Σ,R
)
Homτφ(S1)
(
Σφ,S1 ,Rφ,S1
)
-
ρφ,S1
FL(S)
(
Σ,R
)
Homτφ(S)
(
Σφ,S,Rφ,S
)
-ρφ,S
?
L(j)
?
φ(L(j))
(3.16)
15Here, A−1φ,S(Ξ) denotes the sub-object of Σφ,S whose characteristic arrow is χΞ ◦ Aφ,S : Σφ,S →
Ωτφ(S), where χΞ : Rφ,S → Ωτφ(S) is the characteristic arrow of the sub-object Ξ.
16In classical physics, the truth object corresponding to a microstate s is the collection of all
propositions that are true in the state s.
21
(c) The function φ(L(j)) : Homτφ(S)
(
Σφ,S,Rφ,S
)
→ Homτφ(S1)
(
Σφ,S1,Rφ,S1
)
is
built from the following ingredients. For each topos realisation φ, there is a
triple 〈τφ(j), φ(j), βφ(j)〉 where:
i. τφ(j) : τφ(S)→ τφ(S1) is a left-exact functor; i.e., an arrow inM(Sys).
ii. φ(j) : Σφ,S1 → τφ(j)
(
Σφ,S
)
is an arrow in τφ(S1).
iii. βφ(j) : τφ(j)
(
Rφ,S
)
→ Rφ,S1 is an arrow in τφ(S1).
These fit together in the diagram
Σφ,S1 Rφ,S1-
φ(L(j))(Aφ,S)
τφ(j)(Σφ,S) τφ(j)(Rφ,S)-
6
φ(j)
?
βφ(j)
τφ(j)(Aφ,S)
Σφ,S Rφ,S-
Aφ,S
?
τφ(j)
?
τφ(j)
(3.17)
The arrows φ(j) and βφ(j) should behave appropriately under composition
of arrows in Sys.
The commutativity of the diagram (3.16) is equivalent to the relation
φ(L(j))(Aφ,S) = [L(j)(A)]φ,S1 (3.18)
for all A ∈ FL(φ,S)
(
Σ,R
)
. As we keep emphasising, the satisfaction or
otherwise of this relation will depend on the theory-type and, possibly, the
representation φ.
(d) If a proposition in τφ(S) is represented by the monic arrow, K →֒ Σφ,S, the
‘pull-back’ of this proposition to τφ(S1) is defined to be φ(j)
−1
(
τφ(j)(K)
)
⊆
Σφ,S1.
6. (a) If S1 is a sub-system of S, with an associated arrow i : S1 → S in Sys then,
in the diagram in (3.17), the arrow φ(j) : Σφ,S1 → τφ(j)(Σφ,S) is a monic
arrow in τφ(S1).
In other words, Σφ,S1 is a sub-object of τφ(j)(Σφ,S), which is denoted
Σφ,S1 ⊆ τφ(j)(Σφ,S). (3.19)
We may also want to conjecture
Rφ,S1 ≃ τφ(j)
(
Rφ,S
)
. (3.20)
(b) Another possible conjecture is the following: if j : S1 → S is an epic arrow
in Sys, then, in the diagram in (3.17), the arrow φ(j) : Σφ,S1 → τφ(j)(Σφ,S)
is an epic arrow in τφ(S1).
In particular, for the epic arrow p1 : S1 ⋄ S2 → S1, the arrow φ(p1) :
Σφ,S1⋄S2 → τφ
(
Σφ,S1
)
is an epic arrow in the topos τφ(S1 ⋄ S2).
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One should not read Rule 2. above as implying that the choice of the state object
and quantity-value object are unique for any give system S. These objects would at
best be selected only up to isomorphism in the topos τ(S). Such morphisms in the
topos τ(S)17 can be expected to play a key role in developing the topos analogue of
the important idea of a symmetry, or covariance transformation of the theory. These
ideas were discussed briefly in Paper III [3].
In the example of classical physics, for all systems we have τ(S) = Sets and Σσ,S is
a symplectic manifold, and the collection of all symplectic manifolds is a category. It
would be elegant if we could assert that, in general, for a given theory-type the possible
state objects in a given topos τ form the objects of an internal category in τ . However,
to make such a statement would require a general theory of state objects and, at the
moment, we do not have such a thing.
From a more conceptual viewpoint we note that the ‘similarity’ of our axioms to
those of standard classical physics is reflected in the fact that (i) physical quantities
are represented by arrows Aφ,S : Σφ,S → Rφ,S; (ii) propositions are represented by
sub-objects of Σφ,S; and (iii) propositions are assigned truth values. Thus any theory
satisfying these axioms ‘looks’ like classical physics, and has an associated neo-realist
interpretation.
4 The General Scheme applied to Quantum Theory
4.1 Background Remarks
We now want to study the extent to which our ‘rules’ apply to the topos representation
of quantum theory.
For a quantum system with (separable) Hilbert space H, the appropriate topos
(what we earlier called τφ(S)) is Sets
V(H)op : the category of presheaves over the cate-
gory (actually, partially-ordered set) V(H) of unital, abelian von Neumann subalgebras
of the algebra, B(H), of bounded operators on H.
From a physical perspective we can think of the objects in V(H)—i.e., the commuta-
tive subalgebras of B(H)—as the ‘contexts’ (or ‘world views’, or ‘windows on reality’)
with respect to which our generalised truth values of propositions are assigned. In
the normal, instrumentalist interpretation of quantum theory, a context is therefore
a collection of physical variables that can be measured simultaneously. The physical
significance of this contextual logic is discussed at length in [7, 8, 9, 10, 11] and [2, 3].
17Care is needed not to confuse morphisms in the topos τ(S) with morphisms in the category
M(Sys) of topoi. An arrow from the object τ(S) to itself in the category M(Sys) is a left-exact
morphism in the topos τ(S). However, not every arrow in τ(S) need arise in this way, and an
important role can be expected to be played by arrows of this type. A good example is when τ(S)
is the category of sets, Sets. Typically, τφ(j) : Sets → Sets is the identity, but there are many
morphisms from an object O in Sets to itself: they are just the functions from O to O.
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A particularly important object in SetsV(H)
op
is the spectral presheaf Σ, where,
for each V , ΣV is defined to be the Gel’fand spectrum of the abelian algebra V . The
sub-objects of Σ can be identified as the topos representations of propositions, just as
the subsets of S represent propositions in classical physics.
In [3], several closely related choices for a quantity-value object Rφ in Sets
V(H)op
were discussed. We concentrate here on the presheaf IR of real-valued, order-reversing
functions. Physical quantities A : Σ → R, which correspond to self-adjoint operators
Aˆ, are represented by natural transformations/arrows δ˘o(A) : Σ→ IR. The mapping
Aˆ 7→ δ˘o(A) is injective. For brevity, we write δ˘(A) := δ˘o(A).18 The arguments given in
this section apply in similar form to the other possible choices for the quantity-value
object.
Geometric Morphisms. Our constructions require a left-exact functor between two
topoi, and one of the natural sources of such things is a geometric morphism. This
fundamental concept in topos theory is defined as follows [6].
Definition 4.1 A geometric morphism φ : F → E between topoi F and E is a pair of
functors φ∗ : E → F and φ∗ : F → E such that
(i) φ∗ ⊣ φ∗, i.e., φ
∗ is left adjoint to φ∗;
(ii) φ∗ is left exact, i.e., it preserves all finite limits.
Geometric morphisms are very important because they are the topos equivalent
of continuous functions. More precisely, if X and Y are topological spaces, then any
continuous function f : X → Y induces a geometric morphism between the topoi
Sh(X) and Sh(Y ) of sheaves on X and Y respectively. In fact, just as the arrows in
the category of topological spaces are continuous functions, so in any category whose
objects are topoi, the arrows are normally defined to be geometric morphisms.
The key result for us is the following theorem ([6] p359):
Theorem 4.1 If ϕ : C → D is a functor between categories C and D, then it induces
a geometric morphism (also denoted ϕ)
ϕ : SetsC
op
→ SetsD
op
(4.1)
for which the functor ϕ∗ : SetsD
op
→ SetsC
op
takes a functor F : D → Sets to the
functor
ϕ∗(F ) := F ◦ ϕop (4.2)
from C to Sets.
In addition, ϕ∗ has a left adjoint ϕ!; i.e., ϕ! ⊣ ϕ
∗.
18Note that this is not the same as the convention used in paper III [3], where δ˘(A) denoted a
different natural transformation.
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The morphism ϕ∗ : SetsD
op
→ SetsC
op
is called the inverse image part of the geometric
morphism ϕ; the morphism ϕ∗ : Sets
Cop → SetsD
op
is called the direct image part.
We will use this important theorem in several crucial places.
4.2 The Translation Representation for a Disjoint Sum of
Quantum Systems
Let Sys be a category whose objects are systems that can be treated using quantum
theory. Let L(S) be the local language of a system S in Sys whose quantum Hilbert
space is denoted HS. We assume that to each function symbol, A : Σ → R, in L(S)
there is associated a self-adjoint operator Aˆ ∈ B(HS),
19 and that the map
FL(S)
(
Σ,R
)
→ B(H)sa (4.3)
A 7→ Aˆ (4.4)
is injective (but not necessarily surjective, as we will see in the case of a disjoint sum
of quantum systems).
We consider first arrows of the form
S1
i1→ S1 ⊔ S2
i2← S2 (4.5)
from the components S1, S2 to a disjoint sum S1⊔S2; for convenience we write i := i1.
The systems S1, S2 and S1⊔S2 have the Hilbert spacesH1,H2 andH1⊕H2, respectively.
As always, the translation L(i) goes in the opposite direction to the arrow i, so
L(i) : FL(S1⊔S2)
(
Σ,R
)
→ FL(S1)
(
Σ,R
)
. (4.6)
Then our first step is find an ‘operator translation’ from the relevant self-adjoint oper-
ators in H1 ⊕H2 to those in H1,
To do this, let A be a function symbol in FL(S1⊔S2)
(
Σ,R
)
. In Section 2.2.1, we
argued that FL(S1⊔S2)
(
Σ,R
)
≃ FL(S1)
(
Σ,R
)
×FL(S2)
(
Σ,R
)
(as in (2.1)), and hence we
introduce the notation A = 〈A1, A2〉, where A1 ∈ FL(S1)
(
Σ,R
)
and A2 ∈ FL(S2)
(
Σ,R
)
.
It is then natural to assume that the quantisation scheme is such that the operator,
Aˆ, on H1 ⊕ H2 can be decomposed as Aˆ = Aˆ1 ⊕ Aˆ2, where the operators Aˆ1 and Aˆ2
are defined on H1 and H2 respectively, and correspond to the function symbols A1 and
A2.
20 Then the obvious operator translation is Aˆ 7→ Aˆ1 ∈ B(H1)sa.
We now consider the general rules in the Definition 3.2 and see to what extent they
apply in the example of quantum theory.
19More specifically, one could postulate that the elements of FL(S)
(
Σ,R
)
are associated with self-
adjoint operators in some unital von Neumann subalgebra of B(HS).
20It should be noted that our scheme does not use all the self-adjoint operators on the direct sum
H1 ⊕H2: only the ‘block diagonal’ operators of the form Aˆ = Aˆ1 ⊕ Aˆ2 arise.
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1. As we have stated several times, the topos τφ(S) associated with a quantum
system S is
τφ(S) = Sets
V(HS)
op
. (4.7)
Thus (i) the objects of the category M(Sys) are topoi of the form SetsV(HS)
op
, S ∈
Ob(Sys); and (ii) the arrows between two topoi are defined to be left-exact functors. In
particular, to each arrow j : S1 → S in Sys there must correspond a left-exact functor
τφ(j) : τφ(S)→ τφ(S1). Of course, the existence of these functors in the quantum case
has yet to be shown.
2. The realisation ρφ,S : L(S)  τφ(S) of the language L(S) in the topos τφ(S)
is given as follows. First, we define the state object Σφ,S to be the spectral presheaf,
ΣV(HS), over V(HS), the context category of B(HS). To keep the notation brief, we
will denote21 ΣV(HS) as ΣHS .
Furthermore, we define the quantity-value object, Rφ,S, to be the presheaf IR
 HS
that was defined in paper III [3]. Finally, we define
Aφ,S := δ˘(A), (4.8)
for all A ∈ FL(S)
(
Σ,R
)
. Here δ˘(A) : ΣHS → IRHS is constructed using the Gel’fand
transforms of the (outer) daseinisation of Aˆ, for details see paper III.
3. The truth object Tψ corresponding to a pure state ψ was discussed in paper II
[2].
4. Let H = |C be the one-dimensional Hilbert space, corresponding to the trivial
quantum system 1. There is exactly one abelian subalgebra of B( |C) ≃ |C, namely |C
itself. This leads to
τφ(1Sys) = Sets
{∗} ≃ Sets = 1M(Sys). (4.9)
5. Let A ∈ FL(S1⊔S2)
(
Σ,R
)
be a function symbol for the system S1 ⊔ S2. Then,
as discussed above, A is of the form A = 〈A1, A2〉 (compare equation (2.1)), which
corresponds to a self-adjoint operator Aˆ1⊕Aˆ2 ∈ B(H1⊕H2)sa. The topos representation
of A is the natural transformation δ˘(〈A1, A2〉) : Σ
H1⊕H2 → IR H1⊕H2, which is defined
at each stage V ∈ Ob(V(H1 ⊕H2)) as
δ˘(〈A1, A2〉)V : Σ
H1⊕H2
V → IR
 H1⊕H2
V
λ 7→ {V ′ 7→ λ|V ′(δ(Aˆ1 ⊕ Aˆ2)V ′) | V
′ ⊆ V } (4.10)
where the right hand side (4.10) denotes an order-reversing function.
We will need the following:
Lemma 4.2 Let Aˆ1 ⊕ Aˆ2 ∈ B(H1 ⊕ H2)sa, and let V = V1 ⊕ V2 ∈ Ob(V(H1 ⊕H2))
such that V1 ∈ Ob(V(H1)) and V2 ∈ Ob(V(H2)). Then
δ(Aˆ1 ⊕ Aˆ2)V = δ(Aˆ1)V1 ⊕ δ(Aˆ2)V2 . (4.11)
21Presheaves are always denoted by symbols that are underlined.
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Proof. Every projection Qˆ ∈ V is of the form Qˆ = Qˆ1 ⊕ Qˆ2 for unique projections
Qˆ1 ∈ P(H1) and Qˆ2 ∈ P(H2). Let Pˆ ∈ P(H) be of the form Pˆ = Pˆ1 ⊕ Pˆ2 such that
Pˆ1 ∈ P(H1) and Pˆ2 ∈ P(H1). The largest projection in V smaller than or equal to Pˆ ,
i.e., the inner daseinisation of Pˆ to V , is
δi(Pˆ )V = Qˆ1 ⊕ Qˆ2, (4.12)
where Qˆ1 ∈ P(V1) is the largest projection in V1 smaller than or equal to Pˆ1, and
Qˆ2 ∈ P(V2) is the largest projection in V2 smaller than or equal to Pˆ2, so
δi(Pˆ )V = δ(Pˆ1)V1 ⊕ δ(Pˆ2)V2 . (4.13)
This implies δ(Aˆ⊕ Bˆ)V = δ(Aˆ)V1 ⊕ δ(Bˆ)V2 , since (outer) daseinisation of a self-adjoint
operator just means inner daseinisation of the projections in its spectral family, and
all the projections in the spectral family of Aˆ⊕ Bˆ are of the form Pˆ = Pˆ1 ⊕ Pˆ2.
As discussed in Section 3, in order to mimic the construction that we have in the
classical case, we need to pull back the arrow/natural transformation δ˘(〈A1, A2〉) :
ΣH1⊕H2 → IR H1⊕H2 to obtain an arrow from ΣH1 to IR H1 . Since we decided that
the translation on the level of operators sends Aˆ1⊕ Aˆ2 to Aˆ1, we expect that this arrow
from ΣH1 to IR H1 is δ˘(A1). We will now show how this works.
The presheaves ΣH1⊕H2 and ΣH1 lie in different topoi, and in order to ‘transform’
between them we need we need a (left-exact) functor from the topos SetsV(H1⊕H2)
op
to
the topos SetsV(H1)
op
: this is the functor τφ(j) : τφ(S)→ τφ(S1) in (3.17). One natural
place to look for such a functor is as the inverse-image part of a geometric morphism
from SetsV(H1)
op
to SetsV(H1⊕H2)
op
. According to Theorem 4.1, one source of such a
geometric morphism, µ, is a functor
m : V(H1)→ V(H1 ⊕H2), (4.14)
and the obvious choice for this is
m(V ) := V ⊕ |C1ˆH2 (4.15)
for all V ∈ Ob(V(H1)). This function from Ob(V(H1)) to Ob(V(H1 ⊕H2)) is clearly
order preserving, and hence m is a genuine functor.
Let µ denote the geometric morphism induced by m. The inverse-image functor of
µ is given by
µ∗ : SetsV(H1⊕H2)
op
→ SetsV(H1)
op
(4.16)
F 7→ F ◦mop. (4.17)
This means that, for all V ∈ Ob(V(H1)), we have
(µ∗FH1⊕H2)V = F
H1⊕H2
m(V ) = F
H1⊕H2
V⊕|C1ˆH2
. (4.18)
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For example, for the spectral presheaf we get
(µ∗ΣH1⊕H2)V = Σ
H1⊕H2
m(V ) = Σ
H1⊕H2
V⊕|C1ˆH2
. (4.19)
This is the functor that is denoted τφ(j) : τφ(S1)→ τφ(S) in (3.17).
We next need to find an arrow φ(i) : ΣH1 → µ∗ΣH1⊕H2 that is the analogue of the
arrow φ(j) : Σφ,S1 → τφ(j)(Σφ,S) in (3.17).
For each V , the set (µ∗ΣH1⊕H2)V = Σ
H1⊕H2
V⊕|C1ˆH2
contains two types of spectral elements
λ: the first type are those λ such that λ(0ˆH1 ⊕ 1ˆH2) = 0. Then, clearly, there is some
λ˜ ∈ ΣH1V such that λ˜(Aˆ) = λ(Aˆ ⊕ 0ˆH2) = λ(Aˆ ⊕ 1ˆH2) for all Aˆ ∈ Vsa. The second
type of spectral elements λ ∈ ΣH1⊕H2
V⊕|C1ˆH2
are such that λ(0ˆH1 ⊕ 1ˆH2) = 1. In fact,
there is exactly one such λ, and we denote it by λ0. This shows that Σ
H1⊕H2
V⊕|C1ˆH2
≃
ΣH1V ∪{λ0}. Accordingly, at each stage V , the mapping φ(i) sends each λ˜ ∈ Σ
H1
V to the
corresponding λ ∈ ΣH1⊕H2
V⊕|C1ˆH2
.
The presheaf IR H1⊕H2 is given at each stage W ∈ Ob(V(H1 ⊕H2)) as the order-
reversing functions ν :↓W → IR, where ↓W denotes the set of unital, abelian von
Neumann subalgebras of W . Let W = V ⊕ |C1ˆH2 . Clearly, there is a bijection between
the sets ↓W ⊂ Ob(V(H1 ⊕H2)) and ↓V ⊂ Ob(V(H)). We can thus identify
(µ∗IR H1⊕H2)V = IR
 H1⊕H2
V⊕|C1ˆH2
≃ IR
H1
V (4.20)
for all V ∈ Ob(V(H)). This gives an isomorphism βφ(i) : µ
∗IR H1⊕H2 → IR H1 , which
corresponds to the arrow βφ(j) : Rφ,S1 → τφ(j)(Rφ,S) in (3.17).
Now consider the arrow δ˘(〈A1, A2〉) : Σ
H1⊕H2 → IR H1⊕H2. This is the analogue
of the arrow Aφ,S : Σφ,S → Rφ,S in (3.17). At each stage W ∈ Ob(V(H1 ⊕H2)), this
arrow is given by the (outer) daseinisation δ(Aˆ1 ⊕ Aˆ2)W ′ for all W
′ ∈↓W . According
to Lemma 4.2, we have
δ(Aˆ1 ⊕ Aˆ2)V⊕|C1ˆH2
= δ(Aˆ1)V ⊕ δ(A2)|C1ˆH2
= δ(Aˆ1)V ⊕max(sp(Aˆ2))1ˆH2 (4.21)
for all V ⊕ |C1ˆH2 ∈ Ob(V(H1 ⊕H2)). This makes clear how the arrow
µ∗(δ˘(〈A1, A2〉)) : µ
∗ΣH1⊕H2 → µ∗IR H1⊕H2 (4.22)
is defined. Our conjectured pull-back/translation representation is
φ(L(i))
(
δ˘(〈A1, A2〉)
)
:= φ(i) ◦ µ∗(δ˘(〈A1, A2〉)) ◦ βφ(i) : Σ
H1 → IR H1. (4.23)
Using the definitions of φ(i) and βφ(i), it becomes clear that
φ(i) ◦ µ∗(δ˘(〈A1, A2〉)) ◦ βφ(i) = δ˘(A1). (4.24)
Hence, the commutativity condition in (3.18) is satisfied for arrows in Sys of the form
i1,2 : S1,2 → S1 ⊔ S2.
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4.3 The Translation Representation for Composite Quantum
Systems
We now consider arrows in Sys of the form
S1
p1
← S1 ⋄ S2
p2
→ S1, (4.25)
where the quantum systems S1, S2 and S1 ⋄ S2 have the Hilbert spaces H1, H2 and
H1 ⊗H2, respectively.
22
The canonical translation23 L(p1) between the languages L(S1) and L(S1 ⋄ S2) (see
Section 2.2.2) is such that if A1 is a function symbol in FL(S1)
(
Σ,R
)
, then the cor-
responding operator Aˆ1 ∈ B(H1)sa will be ‘translated’ to the operator Aˆ1 ⊗ 1ˆH2 ∈
B(H1 ⊗ H2). By assumption, this corresponds to the function symbol A1 ⋄ 1 in
FL(S1⋄S2)
(
Σ,R
)
.
Operator entanglement and translations. We should be cautious about what
to expect from this translation when we represent a physical quantity A : Σ → R in
FL(S1)
(
Σ,R
)
by an arrow between presheaves, since there are no canonical projections
H1 ←H1 ⊗H2 →H2, (4.26)
and hence no canonical projections
ΣH1 ← ΣH1⊗H2 → ΣH2 (4.27)
from the spectral presheaf of the composite system to the spectral presheaves of the
components.24
This is the point where a form of entanglement enters the picture. The spectral
presheaf ΣH1⊗H2 is a presheaf over the context category V(H1 ⊗ H2) of H1 ⊗ H2.
Clearly, the context category V(H1) can be embedded into V(H1⊗H2) by the mapping
V1 7→ V1⊗ |C1ˆH2 , and likewise V(H2) can be embedded into V(H1⊗H2). But not every
W ∈ Ob(V(H1 ⊗H2)) is of the form V1 ⊗ V2.
22As usual, the composite system S1 ⋄ S2 has as its Hilbert space the tensor product of the Hilbert
spaces of the components.
23As discussed in Section 2.2.2, this translation, L(p1), transforms a physical quantity A1 of system
S1 into a physical quantity A1 ⋄ 1, which is the ‘same’ physical quantity but now seen as a part of
the composite system S1 ⋄ S2. The symbol 1 is the trivial physical quantity: it is represented by the
operator 1ˆH2 .
24On the other hand, in the classical case, there are canonical projections
Σσ,S1 ← Σσ,S1⋄S2 → Σσ,S2 (4.28)
because the symplectic manifold Σσ,S1⋄S2 that represents the composite system is the cartesian product
Σσ,S1⋄S2 = Σσ,S1 × Σσ,S2 , which is a product in the categorial sense and hence comes with canonical
projections.
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This comes from the fact that not all vectors in H1 ⊗H2 are of the form ψ1 ⊗ ψ2,
hence not all projections in P(H1⊗H2) are of the form Pˆψ1⊗Pˆψ2 , which in turn implies
that not all W ∈ V(H1 ⊗ H2) are of the form V1 ⊗ V2. There are more contexts, or
world-views, available in V(H1 ⊗H2) than those coming from V(H1) and V(H2). We
call this ‘operator entanglement’.
The topos representative of Aˆ1 is δ˘(A1) : Σ
H1 → IR H1, and the representative of
Aˆ1 ⊗ 1ˆH2 is δ˘(A1 ⋄ 1) : Σ
H1⊗H2 → IR H1⊗H2 . At subalgebras W ∈ Ob(V(H1 ⊗H2))
which are not of the form W = V1 ⊗ V2 for any V1 ∈ Ob(V(H1)) and V2 ∈ Ob(V(H2)),
the daseinised operator δ(Aˆ1W ⊗ 1ˆH2) ∈Wsa will not be of the form δ(Aˆ1)V1⊗δ(Aˆ1)V2 .
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On the other hand, it is easy to see that δ(Aˆ1⊗1ˆH2)W = δ(Aˆ1)V1⊗1ˆH2 ifW = V1⊗ |C1ˆH2 .
Given a physical quantity A1, represented by the arrow δ˘(A1) : Σ
H1 → IR
H1
, we
can (at best) expect that the translation of this arrow into an arrow from ΣH1⊗H2 to
IR
H1⊗H2
coincides with the arrow δ˘(A1 ⋄ 1) on the ‘image’ of Σ
H1 in ΣH1⊗H2 . This
image will be constructed below using a certain geometric morphism. As one might
expect, the image of ΣH1 is a presheaf P on V(H1⊗H2) such that P V1⊗|C1ˆH2
≃ ΣH1V1 for
all V1 ∈ V(H1), i.e., the presheaf P can be identified with Σ
H1 exactly on the image
of V(H1) in V(H1 ⊗ H2) under the embedding V1 7→ V1 ⊗ |C1ˆH2. At these stages, the
translation of δ˘(A1) will coincide with δ˘(A1 ⋄ 1). At other stages W ∈ V(H1 ⊗ H2),
the translation cannot be expected to be the same natural transformation as δ˘(A ⋄ 1)
in general.
A geometrical morphism and a possible translation. The most natural ap-
proach to a translation is the following. Let W ∈ Ob(V(H1 ⊗H2)), and define
VW ∈ Ob(V(H1)) to be the largest subalgebra of B(H1) such that VW ⊗ |C1ˆH2 is a
subalgebra of W . Depending on W , VW may, or may not, be the trivial subalgebra
|C1ˆH1. We note that if W
′ ⊆W , then
VW ′ ⊆ VW , (4.29)
but W
′
⊂W only implies VW ′ ⊆ VW .
The trivial algebra |C1ˆH1 is not an object in the category V(H1). This is why
we introduce the ‘augmented context category’ V(H1)∗, whose objects are those of
V(H1) united with |C1ˆH1 , and with the obvious morphisms ( |C1ˆH1 is a subalgebra of all
V ∈ V(H1)).
Then there is a functor n : V(H1 ⊗H2)→ V(H1)∗, defined as follows. On objects,
n : Ob(V(H1 ⊗H2)) → Ob(V(H1)∗)
W 7→ VW , (4.30)
and if iW ′W : W
′ → W is an arrow in V(H1 ⊗ H2), we define n(iW ′W ) := iVW ′VW (an
arrow in V(H1)∗); if VW ′ = VW , then iVW ′VW is the identity arrow idVW .
25Currently, it is even an open question if δ(Aˆ1W ⊗ 1ˆH2) = δ(Aˆ1)V1 ⊗ 1ˆH2 if W = V1 ⊗ V2 for a
non-trivial algebra V2.
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Now let
ν : SetsV(H1⊗H2)
op
→ Sets(V(H1)∗)
op
(4.31)
denote the geometric morphism induced by π. Then the (left-exact) inverse-image
functor
ν∗ : Sets(V(H1)∗)
op
→ SetsV(H1⊗H2)
op
(4.32)
acts on a presheaf F ∈ Sets(V(H1)∗)
op
in the following way. For allW ∈ Ob(V(H1 ⊗H2)),
we have
(ν∗F )W = F nop(W ) = F VW (4.33)
and
(ν∗F )(iW ′W ) = F (iVW ′VW ) (4.34)
for all arrows iW ′W in the category V(H1 ⊗H2).
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In particular, for all W ∈ V(H1 ⊗H2), we have
(ν∗ΣH1)W = Σ
H1
VW
, (4.36)
(ν∗IR H1)W = IR
 H1
VW
. (4.37)
Since VW can be |C1ˆH1 , we have to extend the definition of the spectral presheaf Σ
H1
and the quantity-value presheaf IR
H1
such that they become presheaves over V(H1)∗
(and not just V(H1)). This can be done in a straightforward way: the Gel’fand spec-
trum Σ|C1ˆH1
of |C1ˆH1 consists of the single spectral element λ1 such that λ1(1ˆH1) = 1.
Moreover, |C1ˆH1 has no subalgebras, so the order-reversing functions on this algebra
correspond bijectively to the real numbers IR.
Using these equations, we see that the arrow δ˘(A1) : Σ
H1 → IR H1 that corresponds
to the self-adjoint operator Aˆ1 ∈ B(H1)sa gives rise to the arrow
ν∗(δ˘(A1)) : ν
∗ΣH1 → ν∗IR H1 . (4.38)
In terms of our earlier notation, the functor τφ(p1) : Sets
V(H1)
op
→ SetsV(H1⊗H2)
op
is
ν∗, and the arrow in (4.38) is the arrow τφ(j)(Aφ,S) : τφ(j)(Σφ,S) → τφ(j)(Rφ,S) in
(3.17) with j : S1 → S being replaced by p : S1 ⋄ S2 → S1, which is the arrow in Sys
whose translation representation we are trying to construct.
The next arrow we need is the one denoted βφ(j) : τφ(j)(Rφ,S) → Rφ,S1 in (3.17).
In the present case, we define βφ(p) : ν
∗IR H1 → IR H1⊗H2 as follows. Let α ∈
(ν∗IR H1)W ≃ IR
 H1
VW
be an order-reversing real-valued function on ↓VW . Then we
26We remark, although will not prove here, that the inverse-image presheaf ν∗F coincides with the
direct image presheaf φ∗F of F constructed from the geometric morphism φ induced by the functor
κ : V(H1) → V(H1 ⊗H2)
V 7→ V ⊗ |C1ˆH2 . (4.35)
Of course, the inverse image presheaf β∗F is much easier to construct.
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define an order-reversing function βφ(p)(α) ∈ IR
 H1⊗H2
W as follows. For all W
′ ⊆ W ,
let
[βφ(p)(α)](W
′) := α(VW ′) (4.39)
which, by virtue of (4.29), is an order-reversing function and hence a member of
IR H1⊗H2W .
We also need an arrow in SetsV(H1⊗H2)
op
from ΣH1⊗H2 to ν∗ΣH1 , where ν∗ΣH1 is
defined in (4.36). This is the arrow denoted φ(j) : Σφ,S1 → τφ(j)(Σφ,S) in (3.17).
The obvious choice is to restrict λ ∈ ΣH1⊗H2W to the subalgebra VW ⊗ |C1ˆH2 ⊆ W ,
and to identify VW ⊗ |C1ˆH1 ≃ VW ⊗ 1ˆH1 ≃ VW as von Neumann algebras, which gives
ΣH1⊗H2
VW⊗|C1ˆH2
≃ ΣH1VW . Let
φ(p)W : Σ
H1⊗H2
W → Σ
H1
VW
λ 7→ λ|VW (4.40)
denote this arrow at stage W . Then
βφ(p) ◦ ν
∗(δ˘(A1)) ◦ φ(p) : Σ
H1⊗H2 → IR H1⊗H2 (4.41)
is a natural transformation which is defined for allW ∈ Ob(V(H1 ⊗H2)) and all λ ∈W
by
(
βφ(p) ◦ ν
∗(δ˘(A1)) ◦ φ(p)
)
W
(λ) = ν∗(δ˘(A))(λ|VW ) (4.42)
= {V ′ 7→ λ|V ′(δ(Aˆ)V ′) | V
′ ⊆ VW}. (4.43)
This is clearly an order-reversing real-valued function on the set ↓W of subalgebras
of W , i.e., it is an element of IR H1⊗H2W . We define βφ(p) ◦ ν
∗(δ˘(A1)) ◦ φ(p) to be the
translation representation, φ(L(p))(δ˘(A1)) of δ˘(A1) for the composite system.
Note that, by construction, for each W , the arrow (βφ(p) ◦ ν
∗(δ˘(A1)) ◦ φ(p))W
corresponds to the self-adjoint operator δ(Aˆ1)VW ⊗ 1ˆH2 ∈Wsa, since
λ|VW (δ(Aˆ1)VW ) = λ(δ(Aˆ1)VW ⊗ 1ˆH2) (4.44)
for all λ ∈ ΣH1⊗H2W .
Comments on these results. This is about as far as we can get with the arrows
associated with the composite of two quantum systems. The results above can be
summarised in the equation
φ(L(p))(δ˘(A1))W = δ˘(A1)VW ⊗ 1ˆH2 (4.45)
for all contexts W ∈ Ob(V(H1 ⊗H2)). If W ∈ Ob(V(H1 ⊗H2)) is of the form W =
V1 ⊗ |C1ˆH2, i.e., if W is in the image of the embedding of V(H1) into V(H1 ⊗ H2),
then VW = V1 and the translation formula gives just what one expects: the arrow
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δ˘(A1) is translated into the arrow δ˘(A1 ⋄ 1) at these stages, since δ(Aˆ1⊗ 1ˆH2)V1⊗|C1ˆH2
=
δ(Aˆ1)V1 ⊗ 1ˆH2 .
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If W ∈ Ob(V(H1 ⊗H2)) is not of the form W = V1 ⊗ |C1ˆH2 , then it is relatively
easy to show that
δ(Aˆ1 ⊗ 1ˆH2)W 6= δ(Aˆ1)VW ⊗ 1ˆH2 (4.46)
in general. Hence
φ(L(p))(δ˘(A1)) 6= δ˘(A1 ⋄ 1), (4.47)
whereas, intuitively, one might have expected equality. Thus the ‘commutativity’ con-
dition (3.7) is not satisfied.
In fact, there appears to be no operator Bˆ ∈ B(H1⊗H2) such that φ(L(p))(δ˘(A1)) =
δ˘(B). Thus the quantity, βφ(p) ◦ ν
∗(δ˘(A1)) ◦ φ(p), that is our conjectured pull-back, is
an arrow in HomSetsV(H1⊗H2)op
(
ΣH1⊗H2, IR H1⊗H2
)
that is not of the form Aφ,S1⋄S2 for
any physical quantity A ∈ FL(S1⋄S2)
(
Σ,R
)
.
Our current understanding is that this translation is ‘as good as possible’: the
arrow δ˘(A1) : Σ
H1 → IR
H1
is translated into an arrow from ΣH1⊗H2 to IR
H1⊗H2
that coincides with δ˘(A1) on those part of Σ
H1⊗H2 that can be identified with ΣH1 .
But ΣH1⊗H2 is much larger, and it is not simply a product of ΣH1 and ΣH2 . The
context category V(H1⊗H2) underlying Σ
H1⊗H2 is much richer than a simple product
of V(H1) and V(H2). This is due to a kind of operator entanglement. A translation
can at best give a faithful picture of an arrow, but it cannot possibly ‘know’ about the
more complicated contextual structure of the larger category.
Clearly, both technical and interpretational work remain to be done.
5 Conclusions
In the previous three papers we have developed the idea that, for a given theory-type,
the theory of a particular system, S, is to be constructed in the framework of a certain,
system-dependent, topos. The central idea is that a local language, L(S), is attached
to each system S, and that the application of a given theory-type to S is equivalent to
finding a representation, φ, of L(S) in a topos τφ(S).
Physical quantities are represented by arrows in the topos from the state object Σφ,S
to the quantity-value object Rφ,S, and propositions are represented by sub-objects
of the state object. The idea of a ‘truth sub-object’ of PΣφ,S then leads to a neo-
realist interpretation of propositions in which each proposition is assigned a truth
value that is a global element of the sub-object classifier Ωτφ(S). In general, neo-realist
statements about the world/system S are to be expressed in the internal language of
27To be precise, both the translation φ(L(p))(δ˘(A1))W , given by (4.45), and δ˘(A⋄1)W are mappings
from ΣH1⊗H2W to IR
H1⊗H2
W . Each λ ∈ Σ
H1⊗H2
W is mapped to an order-reversing function on ↓W . The
mappings φ(L(p))(δ˘(A1))W and δ˘(A⋄1)W coincide at allW ′ ∈↓W that are of the formW ′ = V ′⊗ |C1ˆH2 .
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the topos τφ(S). Underlying this is the intuitionistic, deductive logic provided by the
local language L(S).
Every classical system uses the same topos, namely the topos of sets. However,
in general, the topos will be system dependent, which leads to the problem of un-
derstanding how the topoi for a class of systems behave under the action of taking
a sub-system, or combining a pair of systems to give a single composite system. In
the present paper, we have presented a set of axioms that capture the general ideas
we are trying to develop. Of course, these axioms are not cast in stone, and are still
partly ‘experimental’ in nature. However, we have shown that classical physics exactly
fits our suggested scheme, and that quantum physics ‘almost’ does: ‘almost’ because
of the issues concerning the translation representation of the arrows associated with
compositions of systems that were discussed in Section 4.3.
Is there ‘un gros topos’? It is clear that there are many topics for future research,
both in regard to the first three papers, and to the present one. As far as the present
paper is concerned, a question that is of particular interest is if there is a single topos
within which all systems of a given theory-type can be discussed. For example, in
the case of quantum theory the relevant topoi are of the form SetsV(H)
op
, where H is
a Hilbert space, and the question is whether all such topoi can be gathered together
to form a single topos (what Grothendieck termed ‘un gros topos’) within which all
quantum systems can be discussed.
There are well-known examples of such constructions in the mathematical literature.
For example, the category, Sh(X), of sheaves on a topological space X is a topos, and
there are collections T of topological spaces which form a Grothendieck site, so that
the topos Sh(T) can be constructed. A particular object in Sh(T) will then be a sheaf
over T whose stalk over any object X in T will be the topos Sh(X).
For our purposes, the ideal situation would be if the various categories of systems,
Sys, can be chosen in such a way that M(Sys) is a site. Then the topos of sheaves,
Sh(M(Sys)), over this site would provide a common topos in which all systems of this
theory type—i.e., the objects of Sys—can be discussed. We do not know if this is
possible, and it is a natural subject for future study.
Some more speculative lines of future research. At a conceptual level, one
motivating desire for the entire research programme was to find a formalism that would
always give some sort of ‘realist’ interpretation, even in the case of quantum theory
which is normally presented in an instrumentalist way. But this particular example
raises an interesting point because the neo-realist interpretation takes place in the topos
SetsV(H)
op
, whereas the instrumentalist interpretation works in the familiar topos Sets
of sets, and one might wonder how universal is the use of a pair of topoi in this way.
Another, related, issue concerns the representation of the PL(S)-propositions of
the form “Aε∆” discussed in paper II. This serves as a bridge between the ‘external’
world of a background spatial structure, and the internal world of the topos. This link
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is not present with the L(S) language whose propositions are purely internal terms of
type Ω of the form ‘A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜’, as discussed in paper I. In a topos representation, φ, of
L(S), these become propositions of the form ‘A ∈ Ξ’, where Ξ is a sub-object of Rφ.
In general, if we have an example of our axioms working neo-realistically in a topos
τ , one might wonder if there is an ‘instrumentalist’ interpretation of the same theory in
a different topos, τi, say? Of course, the word ‘instrumentalism’ is used metaphorically
here, and any serious consideration of such a pair (τ, τi) would require a lot of very
careful thought.
However, if a pair (τ, τi) does exist, the question then arises of whether there is a cat-
egorial way of linking the neo-realist and instrumentalist interpretations: for example,
via a functor I : τ → τi. If so, is this related to some analogue of the daseinisa-
tion operation that produced the representation of the PL(S)-propositions, “Aε∆”
in quantum theory? Care is needed in discussing such issues since informal set theory
is used as a meta-language in constructing a topos, and one has to be careful not to
confuse this with the existence, or otherwise, of an ‘instrumentalist’ interpretation of
any given representation.
If such a functor, I : τ → τi, did exist then one could speculate on the possibility
of finding an ‘interpolating chain’ of functors
τ → τ 1 → τ 2 → · · · → τn → τi (5.1)
which could be interpreted conceptually as corresponding to an interpolation between
the philosophical views of realism and instrumentalism!
Even more speculatively one might wonder if “one person’s realism is another per-
son’s instrumentalism”. More precisely, given a pair (τ, τi) in the sense above, could
there be cases in which the topos τ carries a neo-realism interpretation of a theory
with respect to an instrumentalist interpretation in τi, whilst being the carrier of an
instrumentalist interpretation with respect to the neo-realism of a ‘higher’ topos; and
so on? For example, is there some theory whose ‘instrumentalist manifestation‘ takes
place in the topos SetsV(H)
op
?
On the other hand, one might want to say that ‘instrumentalist’ interpretations
always take place in the world of classical set theory, so that τi should always be
chosen to be Sets. In any event, it would be interesting to study the quantum case
more closely to see if there are any categorial relations between the formulation in
SetsV(H)
op
and the instrumentalism interpretation in Sets. It can be anticipated that
the action of daseinisation will play an important role here. We hope to say more
about this in a later paper.
Implications for quantum gravity. A serious claim stemming from our work is
that a successful theory of quantum gravity should be constructed in some topos U—
the ‘topos of the universe’—that is not the topos of sets. All entities of physical interest
will be represented in this topos, including models for space-time (if there are any at a
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fundamental level in quantum gravity) and, if relevant, loops, membranes etc. as well
as incorporating the anticipated generalisation of quantum theory.
Such a theory of quantum gravity will have a neo-realist interpretation in the topos
U , and hence would be particularly useful in the context of quantum cosmology. How-
ever, in practice, physicists divide the world up into smaller, more easily handled,
chunks, and each of them would correspond to what earlier we have called a ‘system’
and, correspondingly, would have its own topos. Thus U would be something like the
‘gros topos’ of the theory, and would combine together the individual ‘sub-systems’ in
a categorial way. Of course, it is most unlikely that there is any preferred way of divid-
ing the universe up into bite-sized chunks, but this is not problematic as the ensuing
relativism would be naturally incorporated into the idea of a Grothendieck site.
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